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Abstract:  
 
For the past two decades, international climate policy has been handled as a matter for State to 
State deliberation. Non-state actors have played at best marginal roles in making and 
implementing international policy. This paper argues that climate change remains an intractable 
transnational problem because State to State deliberations failed to acknowledge that both 
climate mitigation and adaptation require ongoing collaborative governance with non-State 
actors to shift normative behaviour. This paper proposes experimenting with scaling up Dutch 
environmental covenants as an international co-regulation strategy to improve both the 
legitimacy and accountability of international climate governance. This paper specifically 
proposes in the context of climate change mitigation implementing a co-regulatory approach 
through a combination of State-approved emission targets and binding individual firm 
environmental agreements.  
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Introduction  
 
In June 2010 reflecting on the 2009 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change‘s Conference of Parties in Copenhagen  and its April and May follow up 
meetings in Bonn, the Japan Times wrote, ―Global warming fight fizzles.‖ After the 
COP-15 meeting, government officials from the G-77 negotiating bloc blamed the 
meeting for locking ―countries into a cycle of poverty forever‖ and civil society leaders 
accused world leaders of signing ―a death warrant for many of the world‘s poorest 
children.‖ 1 Unsurprisingly, given the inability for States to make meaningful 
compromises because of a combination of ideological reasons and pressure from internal 
constituencies, there has been a lack of global enthusiasm for States to re-engage in 
future State to State negotiations.  As a result, State to State negotiations continue in a 
desultory ad hoc  fashion with United States negotiators waiting for clear signs of 
commitment from China and India while European negotiators lose patience with their 
North American counterparts.  
 
                                               
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho.  Anastasia Telesetsky.  
1 John Vidal, Low targets, goals dropped: Copenhagen ends in failure, The Guardian, (18 December 18 
2009).  
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Even though geographically specific consequence of continued climate change remain 
uncertain, the general trend is clear—we need to make systemic changes to avert future 
scenarios replete with unpredictable severe weather, depleted food stocks, and scarce 
freshwater.  In order to maintain 500 ppm of carbon dioxide, the level at which 
scientists predict irreversible ecological shifts, global carbon dioxide emissions need to 
be reduced by 50% within approximately the next 50 years. 2 Since all policymaking is 
accompanied with some period of inertia before adequate implementation, the time 
frame is short.  
 
Yet, as this paper will argue, the key to achieving mitigation relies not so much on the 
ability of States to cooperate at intergovernmental meetings as on the will power and 
decision-making powers of corporate stakeholders. Traditionally a state-centric model 
of international law has relied on a majority of States at intergovernmental meetings 
defining globally beneficial policies to be subsequently implemented domestically. This 
approach works well where there exists uniformity among States, a good faith effort to 
translate the agreed upon tenets of international law into binding and precise domestic 
law, and where States have authority. Governance for the environment, however, has 
undergone massive shifts in the past few decades so that authority to respond to 
environmental challenges has shifted from top-down approaches by public actors to 
lateral interventions by private actors. Private corporate actors, especially transnational 
corporation, play key roles in environmental ―governance without government.‖ 3 
Drawing on the disaggregated power of globalization, transnational governance 
continues to expand its reach beyond simply commercial matters. What corporations 
decide to do matters to more than simply corporate shareholders and commercial actors. 
New forms of governance are branching across the classical schism between public 
international law and private international law. Repeat international interaction 
between public and private actors is leading to new international leadership roles for 
private commercial actors as well as the adoption of new norms by States.4   
 
Yet in spite of the changes in governance, States have made few formal changes in 
incorporating corporate actors into governmental negotiations as both decision-makers 
and implementers of international policy. While corporations regularly exercise their 
rights to be heard in environmental lawmaking as lobbying interests, States have rarely 
formally engaged private actors in negotiations over emissions.5 This lack of a public 
relationship between corporations and states in the arena of global environmental 
                                               
2 Stephen, Pacala and Robert Socolow, ―Stabilisation Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 
50 Years with Current Technologies‖ (2004) Science 968-972. 
3 See generally James Rosenau and Ernst Otto Czempiel (eds.) Governance without Government: Order and 
Change in World Politics (Cambridge University Press 1992).  
4 A. Claire Cutler, Private Power and Global Authority: Transnational Merchant Law in the Global Political 
Economy (Cambridge University Press 2003) 1. (―State-based, positivist international law and ‗public‘ 
notions of authority are being combined with or, in some cases, superseded by nonstate law, informal 
normative structures, and ‗private‘ economic power and authority as a new transnational legal order takes 
shape.‖ 
5 But compare the New Zealand negotiations with major emitters. Between 1994 and 2000, New Zealand 
negotiated with major emitters for  voluntary agreements to reduce carbon dioxide emissions within 
industries. New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, ―Discussion Paper on Measures to Reduce 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions in New Zealand Post-2012: Emission Reduction Agreements‖ 
<http://www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/climate/discussion-paper-post-2012-dec06/html/page9.html> 
accessed 15 May 2011. 
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governance may become problematic since private actors ―do influence the negotiations 
between public actors‖ and ―more importantly, they govern in some areas.‖6  
 
This paper calls for experimentation with new governance mechanism that formally 
recognizes both the political, economic, and social authority of both States and non-
State commercial actors.  Most hybrid international governance efforts related to 
climate change have been largely informal efforts which have been difficult to measure 
progress because there have been an absence of targets. This paper proposes instead 
scaling up domestic environmental co-governance mechanisms providing for binding 
agreements between States and private interests to an intergovernmental level. The 
proposal is not meant to be a universal proposal but to be an option for public-private 
partnership between willing States and willing corporate actors. The paper concludes 
with a review of some of the challenges of creating an environmentally adequate 
international co-governance system in light of some of the major emitters being 
nationally owned sovereign entities.    
 
For purposes of this paper, mitigation is defined narrowly as either an immediate 
reduction or elimination of greenhouse gases within a short time frame. Short-term 
mitigation requires not just a change to new low carbon products but also a cessation of 
existing high carbon activities. While this paper acknowledges that introducing new 
energy sources such as renewable and planting new carbon sinks are part of a long-term 
greenhouse gas mitigation strategy, short-term immediate mitigation will be crucial  if 
we are to achieve anywhere near a 50% global carbon dioxide emissions reduction 
within the next 50 years.7 Within this paper, the term mitigation does not include long-
term carbon offset programs, preservation of existing carbon sinks, or any geo-
engineering effort to absorb carbon.  While these latter programs may be part of a long-
term mitigation strategy, they do not easily translate into easily measured reductions in 
atmospheric greenhouse gases.  
1. Existing Public-Private Hybrid Governance for Climate Change 
Mitigation 
 
There are an array of hybrid public-private partnerships that are being forged 
internationally to address climate change. Almost of these international efforts are 
directed at jumpstarting the green economy that will wean States and firms from fossil 
fuel dependency and provide a transition to a low-carbon future. Two examples include 
the majority of the projects under the Clean Development Mechanism and EV20.  The 
Clean Development Mechanism provides a framework for public and private entities 
from an investor state to support sustainable development projects in exchange for 
credits towards meeting reduction commitments. Many projects credited under the 
                                               
6 Virginia Haufler, ―Transnational Actors and Global Governance‖ in Magali Delmas and Oran Young 
(eds.) Governance for the Environment (Cambridge University Press 2009) 119, 122. 
7 Since the emission reduction projection was made by Pacala and Socolow, supra note 2, carbon emissions 
have increased so that we are currently at approximately 393 ppm. In 2004, when Pacala and Socolow 
published their article, we were around 380 ppm. For updated numbers see Trends in Carbon Dioxide 
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Earth Science Research Laboratory 1 May 2011) 
http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/  accessed 15 May 2011.  
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Clean Development Mechanism may not be actually eliminating existing greenhouse 
gas intensive products and or fossil fuel practices in the recipient countries but are 
rather creating long-term low-carbon infrastructure.    EV20 includes as corporate 
partners Smith Electric Vehicles, Johnson Controls, and Deutsche Bank and as 
governments partners subnationals such as New York State and Quebec Province. The 
purpose of the EV20 initiative is to creating better collaboration on financing and 
promoting infrastructure for one million additional electric cars within the next five 
years. Understandably from a commercial perspective, very few of the international 
public-private partnerships focus on short-term mitigation rather than long-term 
adaptation projects such as green economy shifting projects. Projects like CDM and 
EV20 present new untapped business opportunities. If the projects come to fruition, 
they will contribute to long-term mitigation efforts by creating new demands for low-
carbon products and processes. Businesses regard short-term mitigation of emissions 
for existing processes and products as lost commercial opportunities as long as 
companies can continue to market and access inexpensive fossil fuels.  
 
There are very few short-term mitigation projects and efforts that can be characterized 
as public and private hybrid international governance.  Under the Clean Development 
Mechanism, of the 1038 projects that have received credits as of April 2011, there are 
only a handful of projects that eliminate greenhouse gases.  Two projects for example 
received credits for converting sulphur hexafluoride, a greenhouse gas which persists 
for a long time in the atmosphere, into a non-greenhouse gas sulfur dioxide. Twenty-
nine projects received credit for Nitrous Oxide abatement 81 projects for methane 
recapture or avoidance, 18 projects for avoidance of hydrofluorocarbons, 23 projects for 
energy efficiency and 36 projects for switching fuel.  The majority of the thousand plus 
projects had no direct effect on mitigation of existing greenhouse gases but instead 
provided new low-carbon infrastructure maximizing resources such as agricultural and 
animal waste. While the CDM projects bring benefit to non-Annex I communities, it 
remains to be seen whether they will have contributed substantially to the need for 
existing emission reductions. Only a few of the companies involved as project 
participants such as BHP Billiton and Mitsubishi are among the largest multinational 
company. There is a noticeable absence of large energy, oil, and transport companies.    
 
One large public-private mitigation initiative exists in the Global Methane Initiative 
which was conceived of at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development as the 
Methane to Markets Partnership.  Led primarily by States with the US EPA providing 
administrative and steering group support, the initiative focuses on opportunities in 
initiative member countries to capture methane and transform it into electricity. 
Industry members network with States through subcommittees on coal, oil and gas, 
agriculture, and landfills. States provide some guidance while project network members 
including industry, academia, financial institutions, state and local governments 
implement methane capture and use projects in States belong to the Initiative.  
 
Some sectors such as the international reinsurance sector in cooperation with 
governments have called for greater emission reduction efforts,  but there are few links 
in insurance products between existing levels of greenhouse gas emissions and 
premiums. The industry has instead focused on indirect efforts that may in the long-
term absorb emissions and reduce the industry‘s exposure to risk. For example in 
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Ethiopia, a local insurance company, reinsured by Swiss Re and supported by the 
government‘s cash-for-work program, has issued micro-insurance for farmers which is 
triggered by a rainfall index.  While this project may reduce short-term individual 
poverty in case of a drought, it doesn‘t reduce directly or systematically greenhouse 
gases. While called a mitigation project, it focuses not on short-term changes in fossil-
fuel dependence but rather on addressing long-term trends by promoting regional tree-
planting.    
 
Most of the short-term, mitigation-specific projects that might loosely be characterized 
under a label of public-private hybrid governance have been focused at soliciting 
volunteer participation at the domestic level from specific sectors. Corporations have 
quickly adopted these programs for fear of more stringent government regulation in 
response to growing political and social pressures to do something about the climate 
issues. These self-regulation voluntary programs have been largely and regrettably 
unsuccessful in achieving meaningful levels of mitigation. Morgenstern, Pizer, and Shih 
evaluated the Climate Wise program, a voluntary program administered by the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency and focused on efforts by non-utilities to 
reduce greenhouse gases.   Participants were expected to develop baseline emission 
estimate and commit to reducing emissions. Yet in retrospect, the program ceased to 
deliver on the transformative possibilities of self-regulation.  When the program ceased 
operation in 2000, it had only made a very modest 3% reduction in emissions over the 
course of six years.   There was no third-party auditing of emissions and no public 
disclosure of emissions. Hindsight suggests that a better model might have been a 
larger role for the government in the Climate Wise program than simply as a facilitator 
providing external publicity and exercising only weak threats of regulation. 
 
Most of the continuing international climate governance mitigation efforts especially 
those being spearheaded by fossil-fuel dependent private sectors continue to favour a 
model of self-regulation and voluntary commitments.   Private actors are setting the 
mitigation agenda for not just public-private ventures but also for future public 
discussions. For example, the oil industry recently released the Petroleum Industry 
Guidelines for Emission Reductions from Carbon Capture and Geological Storage  
providing that implementing carbon capture strategies would be considered an emission 
reduction by the oil sector. If they are to maintain their international authority as 
legitimate rule makers, State and intergovernmental organization leaders will needs to 
re-engage the private sector to ensure that the private sector by making particular types 
of targeted investments such as in carbon capture rather than renewable infrastructure 
does not artificially reduce the choices available to public governance actors. As States 
have reached an impasse with other States in terms of negotiating public international 
mitigation strategies, engagement with the private sector provides an alternative 
negotiating table for States to seek mitigation through private international law means. 
One means of engaging the private sector in a transparent fashion that will enhance 
State legitimacy while leveling the competitive field for private actors within a sector is 
through co-regulation of the largest global emitters. Corporate actors are already 
pledging to reduce emissions.  A central co-governance mechanism linked to ability to 
trade would induce more corporate actors including large emitters to engage in short-
term emission mitigation. The following section describes one national model for co-
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regulation and proposes scaling up the model as a basis for global international 
regulation. 
2. Scaling up Co-Regulation for Climate Change: Dutch Co-
Regulation and the Energy Efficiency Benchmarking Covenant 
 
There is increasing recognition by the largest global companies that they will need to 
engage in some action on climate change to protect their corporate interests. In a report 
from global auditors Ernst & Young, 70% of the 300 corporate executives from 
companies with at least $1 billion in annual revenue indicated that they intend to 
increase spending on climate change initiatives between 2010 and 2012.8 Most of this 
spending will likely be targeted at long-term transitioning into products and services 
for the green economy rather than on making short-term reductions that are needed to 
achieve mitigation.  The unabated use of fossil fuels combined with the massive 
production of cement continues to contribute the lion share of emissions.9  
 
The few public-private efforts described above to collaboratively mitigate corporate 
emissions all rely on voluntary self-regulation which encourages free-riding behaviour 
by non-participants and early defection by parties that are unable to meet targets. So far 
no one has piloted a co-regulatory approach for governments and corporations to share 
regulatory rule-making and implementation responsibilities. As Karin Backstrand 
observes in her work on networked climate governance ―no example of public-private 
partnerships in rule making can be identified in the climate governance arena.‖10 Co-
regulation is an underexplored option for improving rule-making and rule 
implementation in the context of climate governance. This section describes how co-
regulation for environmental rule-making and implementation has operated within the 
Dutch legal system. The section that follows proposes using the Dutch co-regulation 
model to create an international co-regulation strategy for negotiators between States 
committed to reducing emissions and major greenhouse gas emitters.  
 
Co-regulation is a model of regulatory interaction between public and private actors, 
which involves a sequential combination of specific goal setting by the government for a 
sector coupled with a case-by-case implementation strategy for individual corporate 
actors within a sector. Co-regulation as a broad concept encompasses voluntary 
environmental management agreements as well as negotiated rule-making. Co-
regulatory approaches have been experimented with in the Netherlands, Denmark, 
                                               
8 Ernst & Young, ―Action Amid Uncertainty-the Business Response to Climate Change‖ (Ernst & Young, 
July 2010) <http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/-
Action_amid_uncertainty:_the_business_response_to_climate_change/$FILE/Action_amid_uncertainty.
pdf > accessed 15 May 2010.  
9    P. Friedlingstein et al. ―Update on CO2 emissions‖ (Nature Geoscience, 21 November 2010) 
November 2010) < http://www.nature.com/ngeo/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/ngeo1022.html> accessed 
15 May 2011. (Finding that in 2009, global fossil fuel and cement emissions were the second highest in 
human history). 
10 Karin Backstrand, ―Accountability of Networked Climate Governance: The Rise of Transnational 
Climate Partnerships‖ (2008) 8(3) Global Environmental Politics 74, 86. 
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Germany, United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Japan.11 In this paper, the term co-
regulation specifically refers to the Dutch practice of co-regulation, which is one of the 
most integrated public-private regulatory systems. Co-regulation is not an isolated 
regulatory strategy but coexists with State-based command and control regulation.  In 
a State that offers co-regulation options, firms have an incentive for participating in a 
co-regulation approach since public government agencies will waive command and 
control regulations as long as firms are making progress towards achieving a specific 
environmental target. Co-regulation has additional appeal for private actors because it 
provides certainty over the course of an industry-government agreement regarding 
regulatory targets.     
 
The most cited general example of successful co-regulation in the environmental field is 
the Dutch environmental covenant which has introduced a whole new form of effective 
hybrid governance. The genesis of co-regulation in the Netherlands was the 1980s. 
When the Christian Democrats and Liberals came into power in 1982, the parties 
emphasized streamlining regulations to order to improve environmental outcomes and 
reduce government inefficiency. Pieter Winsemius, the Minister for Housing, Spatial 
Planning, and the Environment, approached regulatory streamlining by promoting an 
environment-wide planning process which would cross the gaps between different 
ministries with environmental responsibilities.12 Pushing for internalization of 
regulations, the government decided to consult with private stakeholders such as 
industry to work towards setting viable environmental targets.13  
 
The process of co-regulation in the Netherlands is an iterative process.14 State agencies 
give private economic associations the powers to enter into binding environmental 
covenants with the government. 15 Prior to beginning negotiations with economic 
associations or industry representatives, the government has already legislated non-
negotiable national environmental performance targets including, for example, 
abatement targets for 200 substances.16 Once these performance targets are set, the 
parties collaborate during a two-part negotiation on strategies for efficiently achieving 
environmental performance.  During the first phase of negotiations, the regulated Party 
makes a declaration of intent that is not binding. In the second phase of negotiations, 
the Parties enter a binding legal relationship based on individual firms developing 
Company Environmental Plans.  State agencies review and comment upon the plans 
                                               
11 Verina Ingram, ―From Sparring Partners to Bedfellows: Joint Approaches to Environmental Policy-
making‖ (1999) 9 European Environment 41-48, 42. 
12 Kenneth Hanf and E.D van de Gronden, ―The Netherlands: Joint Regulation and Sustainable 
Development‖ in Kenneth Hanf and Alf-Inge Jansen (eds), Governance and Environment in Western Europe: 
Politics, Policy and Administrations (Pearson Education 1998) 152-180, 165. 
13 See generally Anthony Zito, Lars Brucker, Andrew Jordan, and Rüdiger Wurzel, ―Instrument 
Innovation in an Environmental Lead State: ―New‖ Environmental Policy Instruments in the Netherlands 
in Andrew Jordan, Rüdiger Wurzel Anthony Zito (eds), New Instruments of Environmental Governance: 
National Experiences and Prospects, (Routledge Press 2003) 157-178, 159. 
14 Pieter Glasbergen, ―Partnership as a Learning Process: Environmental Covenants in the Netherlands‖ 
in Pieter Glasbergen (ed), Co-operative Environmental Governance, (Springer 1998) 133-156. 
 15 Kathryn Harrison, ―Talking with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to Environmental Protection‖, 
(1996) 2(3) Journal of Industrial Ecology 51, 63. 
16 Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development, Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policy: 
An Assessment (1999) 20. 
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before the plans are released to the public. A joint government-industry ―steering 
group‖ reviews the performance of the industry in making progress towards meeting its 
goals under the covenant.  
 
What is unusual about the Dutch process in contrast to other public-private voluntary 
negotiated agreements is that while the covenants may be entered into voluntarily, once 
parties conclude a covenant, the covenants are legally binding.17 The contracts may 
include civil liability measures where a company has failed to comply with the terms of 
its agreement.  
 
In the Netherlands, private firms in numerous industry sectors have entered legally 
binding environmental covenants18 with the government in the sectors of agriculture, 
refining, energy, building and waste disposal. The 100 plus covenants cover a wide 
spectrum of problems including climate change, acidification, eutrophication, toxic 
pollution, soil contamination, groundwater contamination, and nuisance. To achieve 
performance goals, the covenants focus on specific aspects of the problems such as 
reducing of nitrous oxide and carbon dioxide from power plants, reducing ammonia 
from cattle breeding,  cleaning up of contaminated soil underneath gasoline stations, 
recycling packaging, and phasing out harmful substances.19  
 
In the 1990s the Ministry for Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment focused 
on addressing industry sector emission targets.20 During the 1990s, the government 
concluded a number of emission reduction agreements including one with the chemical 
industry in 1993 and one with the oil and gas extraction industry in 1995. 
Environmental managers heralded the 1993 agreement with the chemical industry as a 
model agreement since it set specific emission targets for 1995, 2000, and 2010.21  
 
Concerning specifically the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, the Dutch 
government designed in 1999 a Benchmarking Covenant to promote energy efficiency 
across multiple industrial sectors in order to reduce immediate demands for fossil fuels. 
22 The Benchmarking Covenant was a response to Netherland‘s obligation under the 
Kyoto Protocol to mitigate national emissions.23 The Ministry of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment on behalf of the central government, provincial 
authorities, the VNO-NCW Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers and 
numerous sectoral organisations including the chemical and the electricity production 
                                               
17 Harrison, supra note 27, at 64.  
18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Environmental Performance Reviews: 
Achievements in OECD Countries, (2001) 49. 
19 Eckard Rehbinder, ―Environmental Agreements, A New Instrument of Environmental Policy, 
European University Institute‖ (1997) Paper RSC No 97/45, <http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-
Texts/JM97_45.html> accessed 15 May 2011. 
20 Peter Borkey and Francois Leveque, ―Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Protection in the 
European Union- A Survey‖, (2000) 10(1) European Environment 35–54. 
21 European Environmental Agency, Environmental Agreements: Environmental Effectiveness (1997) < 
http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/92-9167-052-9-Vol1> accessed 15 May 2011.  
22 Government of the Netherlands, Energy Efficiency Benchmarking Covenant, (1 July 1999) 
<www.benchmarking-energie.nl/pdf_files/covteng.pdf> accessed 15 May 2011. 
23 Id. at p. 6 
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industries signed the Benchmarking Covenant.24 The covenant functions as a civil law 
agreement. 25In return for no additional national legislation being imposed on the 
participating companies and no ―specific national energy tax‖ being levied, the 
companies agree in their production plants to become world leaders in energy efficiency 
by ―complying with the best international energy efficiency standards.‖26 Companies are 
expected to independently ratchet-up their compliance to become world energy 
efficiency leaders by 2012. The standards for leaders are based on a benchmark 
identified by third-party experts or best practice approach.27 In setting benchmarks and 
best practices, experts are expected to look at the average energy efficiency of regions 
―outside the Netherlands that are comparable with the Netherlands in terms of size and 
number of processing plants‖, and to set an energy efficiency benchmark based on the 
performance of the top 10% most efficient production plants.28 The energy efficiency 
benchmarks should be re-evaluated every 4 years.29 Where a company fails to comply 
with its agreements under the Benchmark Covenant, Article 22 provides for sanctions. 
After conferring with parties that may be out of compliance, the Dutch government is 
expected to ―make efforts to tighten the terms of the Company‘s current environmental 
licence in a unilateral action‖30. Notably all commitments unless otherwise noted are 
―effort commitments‖ and not ―result commitments.‖31  
 
Some academics question whether the Dutch benchmarking covenants have been 
effective in improving energy usage because even where goals are clear and sanctions 
have been set since corporate actors have not made major changes in their business 
practices.32  Others observe that there have been significant normative shifts with the 
benchmarking process and that some of the successes of the co-regulation process have 
included more ambitious targets than ―business as usual‖, quantified objectives, clear 
staged goals, frequent reporting, independent verification of reporting, sanctions for 
non-compliance, and institutionalization of environmental cooperation through working 
groups. 33 While it remains to be seen whether the post 2012 review of the 
benchmarking covenant will yield the results expected by the government, the 
government has been sanguine about the impact of the covenant that includes 
participation by 84 per cent of industrial manufacturers comprising 94 per cent of the 
                                               
24 Id.   at p. 5 
25 Id. at Article 25(1), p. 22.  
26 Id. at Article 2, p. 9.  
27 Id. at Article 4, p. 10. (Noting also that sectoral organizations representing a number of companies 
cannot serve as third-party expert but that each company must Commission its own expert) 
28 Id. at Article 5, p. 11. 
29 Id. at Article 6, p. 12. 
30 Id. at Article 22, p. 21 
31 Id. at Article 25(3), p. 22. (Article 2 providing that ―as many processing plants of the participating 
facilities as possible realise the best international energy-efficiency standards, in accordance with the 
procedures agreed in 
this Covenant, at the earliest opportunity and no later than 2012‖ is identified as a result commitment.‖)  
32 Elbert Dijkgraaf et al., Effectiviteit Convenanten Energie Belied, (October 2009)   
<http://www.seor.nl/media/publications/effectiviteit_convenanten_energiebeleid___.pdf > accessed 15 
May 2011 
33 Holger Dalkmann, Daniel Bongardt, Katja Rottman, and Sabine Hutfilter, Review of Voluntary 
Approaches in the European Union (Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy 2005) 45. 
(Described emissions reduction in the Netherlands by the brewing industry) 
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energy consumption by the industrial sector. 34In a 2002 report, the government 
reported that they expect the Dutch industrial sector, as distinguished from the 
electricity producing sector, to reduce 4.6 million tons of carbon dioxide by 2012.35   
 
Part of the success of co-regulation at an industry level is that industry leaders may be 
implicitly encouraging better performance from their peers and subcontractors for fear 
of a return to command and control regulation if the industry as a whole fails to 
perform. Because industries play an active rather than passive role in co-regulation, a 
co-regulatory approach sustains long-term collective action on the part of an industry 
sector. Industries are perceived not just as part of the problem but also a key part of the 
solution. In addition to accelerating the achievement of some environmental goals, co-
regulation in the Netherlands has also had the added advantage of improving overall 
collaboration between government and industry on general environmental problem 
solving. 36 Acknowledging that covenants are no ―magic bullet‖ for super-wicked 
problems like climate change,  covenants still have the potential to play an important 
role in international climate change governance by enhancing private participation in 
international climate governance and  providing greater transparency in corporate 
decision-making related to emission reductions.  
3. International Co-regulation through Private Legal Agreements: 
Reimagining International Climate Negotiations to Achieve Greater 
Reciprocity, Legitimacy, and Accountability    
 
Regular intergovernmental meetings convened by United Nations Environmental 
Programme or by Secretariats for the various multilateral environmental agreements 
are key fora where social relationships are built, reciprocity is extended, and parties 
contemplate potential international regulatory frameworks. There has been a notable 
absence of collaborative regulations between States and private actors to achieve 
greenhouse gas mitigation within international fora. The Dutch environmental 
covenants present an interesting model for international corporate climate mitigation 
particularly for the largest transnational corporations. Corporate change has been slow 
in climate mitigation in part because certain groups of high-emitting corporations have 
actively resisted intergovernmental regulation while other corporations have passively 
waited to see what regulatory scheme may be implemented before changing corporate 
behaviours.  
 
A co-regulatory approached modeled on the Dutch approach presents opportunities as 
well as limitations. The remainder of this paper will examine the international context 
for co-regulation, explain why scaling up a Dutch covenant model could be effective in 
international efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases, and why co-regulation meets 
international standards.  
                                               
34 Government of the Netherlands, ―Benchmarking Covenant: High Degree of Industrial Participations, 
2002 Interim Report‖ (2002) < http://www.benchmarking-
energie.nl/pdf_files%5CBenchmarking%20Covenant%20uka.doc>  at p. 1 accessed 15 May 2011. 
35 Id. at p. 2. 
36 Hans Bresser  and Theo De Bruijn, Environmental Voluntary Agreements in the Dutch Context in 
Edoardo Croci (ed), The Handbook of Environmental Voluntary Agreements (Springer 2005) 261, 273-274. 
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3.1 The Context for International Co-regulation 
 
If co-regulation presents a better collaborative public private model than self-regulation 
as this paper argues, it can only be implemented if there are substantial procedural 
changes in how parties conduct intergovernmental negotiations. It is time for a 
procedural paradigm shift moving international environmental law and policy from an 
exclusive State-centric club to a more ―democratic‖ space where non-governmental 
interests are formally recognized as legitimate policymakers capable of being bound by 
international commitments.  
 
Corporate actors already have marked informal influences on international law-making 
processes and exercise ―coercive power‖ in governance processes because they are able 
to set standards and enforce compliance with these standards. 37 By setting standards 
that determine what products and services are available in the global marketplace, 
corporate actors define the parameters of international legal regulation. In the context 
of self-regulation, corporations legislate the technical aspects of their business by 
actively negotiating and creating consensus on international environmental 
management standards through organizations such as the International Standard 
Organization 
 
These same actors also play key roles in existing international policymaking by 
supplying experts, lobbying State representatives, and participating as non-state 
observers at intergovernmental meetings.  In certain intergovernmental processes such 
as the drafting and updating of the Codex Alimentarius, industry is expected to provide 
regular input on whether proposed rules and standards are technically feasible for 
commercial production. Technical experts employed by governments circulate proposed 
changes to the Codex Alimentarius to both government and industry representatives 
for comment.38 In the cases of highly technical matters of regulation where both the 
government and industry participate, there is often little divergence between a standard 
proposed by a corporate interest and the ultimately legislated standard.   
 
Corporations participate regularly as non-state observers at intergovernmental 
meetings.  In this position, private for-profit entities have the opportunity to attend 
most sessions of the meeting, make oral interventions, disseminate information either 
directly at the meeting or through side events, and informally lobby members of State 
delegations. In recent meetings, business interests have advocated for States to adopt 
specific policy positions. For example, at the Sixth Conference of Parties for the Kyoto 
Protocol, the International Chamber of Commerce delegation pushed for States to adopt 
the position to permit carbon transfers to be available for trade across State boundaries. 
39The ICC also supported the position that multinationals be able to participate in the 
                                               
37 Jody Freeman,  ―The Private Role in Public Governance‖ (2000) 75 New York University Law Review 
543, 547. 
38 State delegations to these meetings have included participants such as senior executives from Danone 
and Nestle. See e.g.  Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
ALINORM 09/32/REP, <ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Alinorm09/al32REPe.pdf > accessed 15 May 2011.  
39 International Chamber of Commerce, ―A Business Perspective for SB12‖. (International Chamber of 
Commerce, 6 June 2000) < http://www.iccwbo.org/id459/index.html> accessed 15 May 2011. 
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Clean Development Mechanism regardless of whether the State where the parent 
corporation resided had ratified the protocol or not. 40 
 
Just as the idea of separating public from private in the domestic administrative legal 
world is a long-promoted legal fiction, so too is the idea that public international law 
must be separated from any private lawmaking influence. As social actors seeking 
reciprocity, government representatives actively seek strategic relationships with 
private businesses especially where the private sector is perceived as having some 
advantage in managing or solving a problem.  These relationships between 
governments and businesses as social actors can be leveraged in both directions. The 
government receives a partner to provide technology and financial transfers to assist 
the public sector in meeting its existing international environmental obligations. 
Businesses receive a favourable reception for proposed technical standards.  
 
International policymaking that was once the sole responsibility of the state or 
international governmental organization has truly become a space of shared 
responsibility.41  There have been a number of other proposals for incorporating 
business interests within the frameworks of existing international environmental law 
including requiring companies to comply with existing multilateral environmental 
agreements. 42  These ideas have received little political traction because there is no 
incentive for corporations to participate in agreements where duties for private actors 
were never originally contemplated.   
 
Co-regulation as captured by the Dutch model presents an interesting alternative to 
engaging the private sector in transnational environmental governance. It gives a 
structure for articulating an environmental result-based framework. Applying a co-
regulation model would narrow the wide-ranging conversation about environmental 
protection and emission reductions to several concrete, technical goals that can be 
measured e.g. emission reductions, water quality standards, or percent of forest 
coverage. This shift from general to specific goal setting would be an explicit 
acknowledgment that international environmental policy requires a technical 
quantifiable rather than qualitative approach. As Contini and Sand have argued 
previously, ―International environmental protection … may and should indeed be a 
highly technical matter‖ rather than a more abstract ethical and philosophical concept. 
43With the structured involvement of the business sector in a coregulatory process, the 
current ―light, thin, top-down‖ approach to domestic environmental regulations pursued 
by many States could be reconfigured to developing more ―heavy, thick and bottom-up‖ 
                                               
40 International Chamber of Commerce, ―ICC Climate Business and Society: Elements for Success at COP-
6‖ (International Chamber of Commerce, 4-15 September 2000). <http://iccwbo.org/id444/index.html> 
accessed 15 May 2011.  
41 Andreas, Scherer, Guido Palazzo, and Dorothee Baumann. ―Global Rules and New Private Actors: 
Toward A New Role of the Transnational Corporation in Global Governance‖ (2006) 16(4) BUSINESS 
ETHICS QUARTERLY 505-32. 
42 Harris Gleckman, ―Balancing TNCs, the states, and the international system in global environmental 
governance: A Critical Perspective‖ in Norichika Kanie and Peter Haas (eds) Emerging Forces in 
Environmental Governance (United Nations University Press 2004) 203, 213. 
43 Paolo Contini and Peter Sand, ―Methods to Expedite Environmental Protection: International 
Ecostandards‖, (1972) 68 American Journal of International Law 37, 56. 
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international environmental regulations.44  
 
In principle co-regulation is a pragmatic approach to a State-to-State governance 
system that has reached an impasse. Public-private environmental agreements with 
targeted goals provide real opportunities to foster innovation that has been especially 
absent at an international level of engagement in spite of the transnational aspects of 
greenhouse gases. Co-regulation can provide simultaneously strict but flexible 
approaches to environmental problem-solving.  As Michael Porter and Claas van der 
Linde argued in 1995, environmental regulatory regimes that are simultaneously strict 
at one level but flexible at another can stimulate innovation which in turn can lead to 
better environmental and business performance. States would supply the strictness in an 
international co-regulatory scheme by negotiating specific performance targets. Firms 
would supply the flexibility by determining how they can best comply with the target or 
how they can transform industry practices to remain economically viable.45 This should 
―create the maximum opportunity for innovation‖ thereby ―leaving the approach to 
innovation to industry and not the standard-setting agency.‖46 
3.2 Scaling up the Dutch Covenant Model 
 
How might a co-regulation system work to address current governance deficits in 
addressing climate change? One promising approach is the Dutch Covenant system that 
has been successful in part because environmental regulation in the Netherlands was 
fractured across ministries and effective implementation required actions by a large 
variety of stakeholders. The same conditions apply in the international system. 
Environmental regulation to provide for climate change mitigation is fragmented across 
numerous domestic and regional governance systems and there are numerous players 
from States, transnational corporations, state-owned corporations, and individual 
citizens contributing to ever-increasing emissions.  
 
The Dutch covenant system‘s success also relies on two institutional arrangements that 
may be unique configured within the Netherlands to bolster the social and political 
conducive to environmental covenant negotiation. First, the Netherlands has a strong 
organization of trade and industry associations with whom the government initially 
engages. Second, the Netherlands has a pre-existing environmental permit system that 
poses a credible regulatory threat for companies that do not agree to enter 
environmental covenants.   At the international level, the States do not formally 
recognize trade and industry associations as anything more than observers.   There are 
no environment specific global regulatory requirements that the international leaders 
can invoke as threats.  
Given the relative success of the Dutch Covenant model at least in terms of nearly 
universal participation of industry actors in some sectors, the ability of the government 
                                               
44 David Bederman, ―Diversity and Permeability in Transnational Governance‖ (2007) 57 Emory Law 
Journal 201, 230. 
45 For example, the Methane to Markets initiative is about transforming a former waste product into an 
innovative energy product.  
46 Michael Porter  and Claas van der Lindt, ―Toward a New Conception of the Environmental-
Competitiveness Relationship‖, (1995) 9(4) JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 97, 110.   
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to maintain some oversight, and the potential for sizable emission cuts,   one means of 
scaling up the Dutch Covenant would be to encourage a proliferation of the model 
among every other State that has signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change to ―Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where 
appropriate, regional programs containing measures to mitigate climate change.‖47 
Assuming that States were willing to experiment with Dutch style covenant system, 
national standard-setting for emission targets would result in a dizzying array of 
targets given the common but differentiated responsibilities of States. While this would 
not necessarily generate the feared ―race to the bottom‖, it could very well have the 
unintended effect of corporate migration for those corporations that are not place-
dependent such as mining or oil companies. Unlike some of the Dutch companies 
participating in the current environmental covenants, there may be no national pride 
shared across a given sector in having a reputation as a global leader in energy 
efficiency or emission reductions.  
 
For a truly transnational problem, a global regulatory target makes sense in terms of 
not imposing barriers on inter-firm competition while still preventing corporate entities 
from externalizing costs of emission. Uniformity provides for predictability. 
Transnational corporations frequently exceed national regulatory standards because 
they adhere to a uniform standard across its own transnational network regardless of 
the geographical setting of a particular corporate entity. Transnational standards for 
appropriate climate emissions can and should emerge to prevent climate mitigation 
activities from posing competitive transboundary disadvantages. Based on previous 
public-private efforts in collaborative governance, transnational standards already exist 
for food safety, nuclear safety, product manufacturing, and environmental management. 
New transnational guidance standards are emerging including for social responsibility.48     
 
In the remainder of this subsection, I discuss one possible approach to developing 
collaborative governance through co-regulation based on target-setting for mitigation 
and negotiating State-private legal agreements to meet targets. Two additional ideas 
are presented to address the role of corporations and industry organizations as 
participants in formal international governance and the need for credible regulatory 
threats.  
 
a. Phase One of Coregulation Negotiations- Target Setting 
 
In the first phase, a plenary of State parties and formal non-state participants would 
meet to debate appropriate regulatory performance goals. The idea of 
intergovernmental target setting is not new. In 2000, State governments set the 
Millennium Development Goals which include explicit targets for humanitarian relief 
by 2015 such as reducing the percentage of individuals living on less than a dollar a 
day.49 Likewise, in 2010, State governments set the Aichi Targets providing for slowing 
the rate of habitat loss by 50% by 2020, increasing the land area to be protected from 13 
                                               
47 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 29, 1932, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) 
(entered into force March 21, 1994), Article 4.  
48 See e.g. ISO 26000 <http://www.iso.org/iso/social_responsibility>  accessed at 15 May 2011. 
49 United Nations, Millennium Development Goals, <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> accessed  
15 May 2011. 
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to 17% by 2020, and increasing the marine protected areas from 1% to 10% over the 
same period.50 Both State and non-state participants would participate in the pre-target 
negotiations, but only State parties would vote either by consensus or majority on the 
adoption of quantitative environmental regulatory performance goals in order to 
advance the goals of international climate change mitigation.  
 
In the context of climate change, performance goals might be set for permissible carbon 
intensiveness for an industry51 or based on broad sector-wide cuts. The performance 
goals would be ideally targeted to specific sectors to focus attention on those corporate 
entities that have the greatest impact on emissions such as electricity generation, 
cement-production, transport and industrial manufacturing. The current economy-wide 
target approach has failed to produce sufficient emission reductions. Sector wide goals 
may ―help provide a more level regulatory playing field in areas where cross-border 
trade and investment is significant.‖ 52 
 
It makes both financial and compliance sense to pursue this co-regulation approach. 
International regulatory harmonization has the advantage of increasing the 
geographical reach of a regulatory goal while simultaneously reducing the engagement 
costs of both States and industries in the regulatory process. As Kal Raustiala has 
observed in his work on transgovernmental networks, harmonization is advantageous 
―[t]o the degree it renders regulatory landscapes similar and provides regularity and 
predictability across borders .‖53 The industry sector negotiated goals would be 
measurable performance standards in contrast to management standards which only 
require changes in how something is processed or produced but do not necessarily lead 
to measurable improvements in environmental quality. 54 
 
b. Phase Two of Coregulation Negotiations- Private Legal Agreements between States 
and Firms  
 
Once the targets are set, in the second phase of implementing a co-regulatory approach, 
representatives from both industry sectors and individual firms within the sector would 
be invited to enter into legally environmental agreements with States to achieve 
negotiated international regulatory goals. Like the environmental efficiency agreements 
negotiated under the Dutch Benchmaking Covenant, any State-private firm legal 
agreement would provide specific timelines for achieving the regulatory goals and 
contractual language for creating internationally binding commitments.  The 
commitments would be covered by private international law with interpretation 
provided through arbitration. In return for becoming a member of an industry sector 
environmental covenant, individual companies would not be subject to domestic State 
                                               
50 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011- 2020, Aichi Biodiversity Targets (Convention on Biological 
Diversity November 2010) <http://www.cbd.int/sp/targets/> accessed 15 May 2011. 
51 Jake Schmidt,  ―Sector-based Approach to the Post-2010 Climate Change Policy Architecture‖ (2008) 8 
CLIMATE POLICY 494, 508: Table 2.  
52 Rob Bradley, ―Slicing the Pie: Sector Based Approaches to International Climate Agreements: Issues 
and Options‖. ( World Resources Institute 2007) <pdf.wri.org/slicing-the-pie.pdf> accessed 15 May 
2011. 
53 Kal Raustiala, ―Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law‖ (2002) 43(1) 
Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 58. 
54 Ralph Espach,  Private Environmental Regimes in Developing Countries (Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 15. 
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regulation unless a State party enters a specific objection at the time the regulatory 
goals are adopted indicating that it intends to impose within its jurisdiction more 
stringent regulatory performance targets than the internationally negotiated goal. As 
with the Dutch covenants, there would be a need for third-party verification of progress 
towards targets and regular firm reporting under the agreements.  
 
In terms of seeking co-management solutions to transboundary problems, co-regulation 
provides an advantage over the current domestic regulatory approach. Co-regulation 
simultaneously provides a uniform standard for a sector coupled with flexibility at the 
firm level in achieving specific environmental targets. Instead of certain practices and 
technologies being mandated, firms can decide what practices and technologies will best 
ensure that the firm achieves its environmental commitments within the context of the 
sector agreement. Since there is no one-size-fits-all approach for industries to meet 
environmental targets, businesses may find business opportunities through the process 
of developing individual company environmental plans to meet sector targets. 
Collaborative governance provides for the potential for new solutions emerging ―from 
face-to-face deliberative engagement among knowledgeable parties who would never 
otherwise share information or devise solutions together.‖ 55 
 
c. Jumpstarting Public-Private Agreements 
 
Since it would be logistically impossible and pragmatically unwise to include every 
relevant non-state stakeholder at the negotiating table, there is a need for streamlining 
actor participation. As noted above, at the international level there is no formal 
recognition of industry bodies except as non-governmental observers. This paper 
proposes that three organizations be formally authorized to participate as non-voting 
participants in any target-setting intergovernmental meeting. The International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), World Business Council on Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), and the International Standards Organization would each be assigned a 
formal non-voting negotiating seat. These organizations would be entitled to submit 
formal proposals to be distributed through the Secretariat, to attend all meetings 
including inter-sessional workshops, and to participate in phase two negotiations over 
State-firm environmental agreements. Presently, the participation of non-state actors is 
restricted to observing subsidiary meetings where policymaking takes place. 56  
 
While none of the proposed organizations are representative of the diversity of global 
business interests, all of these organizations have had successful long histories in 
representing corporate interests. The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) would 
be an obvious candidate for a formal business interest seat at the intergovernmental 
negotiating table. The organization has been in existence since 1919 and, in fact, 
enjoyed full voting rights before the League of Nations57 where it participated in 
                                               
55 Jody Freeman, ―Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State‖, (1997) 45 UCLA Law Review 
1, 22-23. 
56 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Rules of Procedures, (UNFCCC 1996) 
<unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop2/02.pdf >  Rule 30(2) accessed 15 May 2011. 
57 Mikoto Usui,  ―The Private Business Sector in Global Environmental Diplomacy‖ in Norichika Kanie 
and Peter Haas (eds) Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance (United Nations University Press 
2004)  216, 223. 
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negotiating conventions on industrial property, scientific property, and bills of 
exchange.58 While it has not been permitted the same voting and negotiating rights 
under the UN framework, it has been an active participant at contemporary 
intergovernmental meetings. It was present at the first United Nations Conference on 
Human Environment where it presented a short intervention.  Its presence has been 
ubiquitous at recent meetings including the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio and the 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development.  
 
Presently, the ICC has general consultative status which means that it can submit oral 
and written interventions during international meetings and can attend meetings open 
to the public. As a body representing many of the largest transnational companies, the 
ICC is an ideal membership candidate to formally advocate for the interest of its 
members such as Chevron, Coca-Cola, Canon, DuPont, Dow Chemicals, Exxon Mobil, 
General Electric, Monsanto, Shell, and Total. In terms of international environmental 
agreement, the ICC could function as an international equivalent of the Dutch 
nationwide trade and industry associations. Just as the Dutch business groups negotiate 
in advance their preferred language for the covenants and the strategies that they 
intend to pursue, the ICC formal position on various issues would be pre-negotiated at 
ICC plenaries.   
 
Another possible candidate for an industry interest seat at intergovernmental meetings 
is the WBCSD. In contrast to the ICC which promotes and protects its members 
international commercial interests, the WBCSD is focused on fostering environmentally 
desirable business practices. The organization started with 50 senior CEOs of major 
companies who spoke on their own behalf and not just on behalf of the companies that 
they represent. The organization now has CEOs from 160 of the world‘s largest 
companies and has formed 35 international business councils. WBCSD regularly 
coordinates with think tanks such as the International Institute for Environment and 
Development and intergovernmental organization such as the World Bank and UNDP 
on developing pro-environment business strategies.   
 
A final permanent candidate for representative engagement in intergovernmental 
meetings and negotiations would be the International Organization for Standards as the 
institution responsible for some of the most widely adopted standards for product 
specifications and environmental management. ISO standards are negotiated primarily 
by industry actors through national standard organizations and then subsequently 
incorporated into intergovernmental policies such as the World Trade Organization 
agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures. 59The ISO would bring not just a 
commercial perspective but also a technical perspective for what it might take to make 
long-term systemic changes in existing industrial systems to achieve particular 
negotiated performance standards.  
 
Depending on the type of target being set, it would be appropriate to seek participation 
of key private firm interest groups representing major players in the international 
                                               
58 Steve Charnovitz, ―Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and international Governance‖ (1997) 18 
Michigan Journal of International Law 183, 225. 
59 Jennifer Clapp, ―The Privatization of Global Environmental Governance: ISO 14000 and the 
Developing World‖ (1998)  4 Global Governance  303, 295-316. 
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energy industry such as the International Association of Oil & Gas producers or 
organizations involved in transportation such as the International Association of 
Independent Tankers Organization.  The success of any international co-regulatory 
experience would depend on broad sector-wide participation. 
 
Why would ICC, WCSBD, ISO, or industry interest groups participate where they have 
been hesitant to engage previously in intergovernmental processes? There are a number 
of reasons for intergovernmental engagement including normative shifts in perceptions 
about climate change and advancement in new technologies. Corporations may engage 
today in a co-regulatory experiment because of internal shifts in corporate decision-
making where company leadership perceives the need to invest in climate solutions out 
of their own long-term self-interest. The potential for rising sea levels impact coastal 
refineries and port infrastructures. Corporate sectors may also be more willing to 
engage today in a co-regulatory governance experiment because alternatives to 
―business as usual‖ are more readily available for adoption. In between the era of 
denying climate change and tentatively accepting climate change, innovation has 
happened in everything from ship design60 to material production.61  
 
There are also long-term institutional advantages to being an early adopter of 
greenhouse gas reducing technologies. Firms that demonstrate commercial viability of 
alternative technologies may gain a competitive advantage in future domestic and 
international standard setting or products and processes.   If the adopters of new 
technologies are key industry players, it becomes even more likely that these same 
targets will ultimately be adopted domestically just as standards set by the 
International Standard Organization have frequently become the basis for numerous 
domestic rules and regulations.62  
 
d. Incentivizing Participation 
 
The success of public-private environmental agreements in the Netherlands is 
predicated on the existence of a credible regulatory threat.  Corporations that opt out of 
voluntary agreements are still subject to regulation. Where a firm believes that an 
external regulatory framework threatens their interests by being administratively 
burdensome or interfering with core corporate interests, there is a clear incentive to 
agree to generalized targets and then select appropriate means to achieve the target.     
 
In an analysis of negotiated environmental agreements, researchers found that in 
addition to having an environment conducive to negotiation and a body that was 
representative of members‘ interests, successful negotiated environmental agreements 
also included ―the stick behind the door.‖ Within the Dutch Benchmarking covenant, 
                                               
60 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, ―Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Completes Conceptual Design of ‗MALS-
14000CS‘: Environmentally Friendly Container Vessel to Reduce CO2 Emissions by 35%‖ (14 October 
2010) <http://www.mhi.co.jp/en/news/story/1010141379.html> accessed 15 May 2011. 
61 John Ochsendorf , ―Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) of Buildings‖, (Concrete Sustainability Hub , 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Interim Report, December 2010) < 
web.mit.edu/cshub/news/pdf/BuildingsLCAsummaryDec2010.pdf> accessed 15 May 2011 (finding that 
Insulated Concrete forms should reduce carbon emissions through energy efficiency savings).  
62 Clapp supra note 71 at 304.  
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―the stick behind the door‖ included subjecting industries to specific yet to be 
determined energy taxes and future energy efficiency legislation. Failure for Dutch 
corporations to appear cooperative would have consequences. Parliamentarians 
responding to the public could reference the lack of a critical mass of industry 
participation as a reason for stricter regulation. Firms may lose autonomy over their 
decision-making.  
 
There is no global legislature or global permitting system that would operate as a 
―stick‖ for international co-regulation. The one international system that matters to all 
multinational firms and to many small and medium sized firms is global trade. Firms 
within a carbon intensive industry sector that opt out of participating in a co-regulation 
experiment might be restrained from trading with States that have agreed to targets. 
This is a potent behind the door stick.  
 
As proposed, this ―stick‖ may seem to violate tenets of most-favoured nation treatment 
under WTO law.  Yet, there is something substantively different. A State that refuses 
products or services from a particular set of large emitting companies who have refused 
to participate in State-firm environmental agreements may do so on the basis of its 
commitments under an emission target negotiation, the UNFCCC or the Kyoto 
Protocol. There is precedent for this approach with State responses to private actors 
engaged in unregulated fishing. Under regional fishing management agreements in 
order to promote conservation efforts and regulated fishing, Port States can deny port 
entry to boats suspected of illegal, underreported and unregulated fishing. They can 
also deny landing and trans-shipment of fish products.63  
 
The same logic applies here. States who have agreed to general emission targets can 
exercise the option to restrict trade with corporations that have not independently 
demonstrated that they are meeting sector-wide targets or participating in a co-
regulation scheme. Assuming that the Dutch would support targets for a global co-
regulatory scheme to reduce carbon, the Netherlands would be able to unilaterally 
restrict trade in products from unregulated U.S. based concrete companies. As with fish 
commodities, there are weaknesses in this approach. Illegal fish become mixed with 
legal fish. Fossil fuels are equally fungible. Yet having access to trade as a ―stick‖ could 
result in subtle ripple effects through economies. Transport companies that fail to 
commit to meeting targets may find ports closed to their services which should result in 
competitive advantages for transport companies that do agree to meet targets. 
Transport companies seeking to lower their emissions may put commercial pressure on 
oil and gas companies to innovate and develop less carbon intensive products.  
3.3 Legitimacy and Transparency in Climate Governance  
 
This paper‘s proposal seeks to remedy an increasing democratic deficit in international 
governance where public transnational policy decisions that rely on cooperation from 
                                               
63 See e.g. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources Conservation Measure 
10-06 (2004), Article 18 (iv) < www.ccamlr.org/pu/e/e_pubs/cm/04-05/10-06.pdf> accessed 15 May 
2011. 
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non-State actors remain under the exclusive aegis of States. The exclusive State-only 
club has not produced behavioural shifts since private firms assume that what is 
negotiated by States in international fora may or may not translate into domestic policy. 
With the exception of a few private firms such as those participating in the World 
Wildlife Fund‘s Climate Saver program, firm await regulatory direction before acting. 
 
Co-regulation provides an impetus for firm action. Under the model proposed in this 
paper, private industry is offered both strict regulatory certainty and regulatory 
flexibility. While the public representatives set sector wide performance targets, 
corporations and industry sectors have broad latitude on how to achieve the 
performance targets. The formal participation of industry actors in negotiating 
agreements creates the opportunity to enhance both the existing legitimacy of the 
intergovernmental process and the effectiveness of international policy. As Karin 
Buhmann suggests, ―participation makes for legitimacy of norms in regulatory 
instruments, and the legitimacy makes for acceptance of resulting constraints.‖64 
Allocating formal seats for business organizations at the intergovernmental negotiating 
table desegregates the international policymaking club of States and opens the process 
up to new and potentially greater norm-generating dynamics. In the proposed co-
regulation framework, firms have the opportunity to participate in a more meaningful 
international regime by becoming active stakeholders in the international process rather 
than largely silent participants watching to see the outcome of negotiations.  
 
The environmental agreement component of the proposal enhances the transparency of 
what firms are doing to meet publicly defined goals. Because the Kyoto Protocol relies 
on exclusively State based commitments, there is little opportunity for the public to 
understand what firms are doing to reduce emissions unless a State requires disclosure 
of emission reduction programs or a firm has entered into an environmental covenant 
requiring public disclosure (e.g. Netherlands and United Kingdom). When firms 
publicly disclose their efforts, government regulators, civil society monitoring groups 
and other private firms understand what a firm is doing to address emissions. The 
transparency of the covenants should contribute to higher levels of accountability on 
the part of sector participants. Government regulators may be able to intervene earlier 
and assist corporate institutions with environmental management challenges. Civil 
society groups will be able to alert the public both to corporate leaders and corporate 
laggards.  Private firm participants may be able to use public information to internally 
sanction or openly criticize other firms that fail to participate effectively in sector 
efforts. Where firms can distinguish themselves on the basis of their environmental 
commitments, they may do so to enhance their corporate reputation and potentially 
improve their market share. 
 
The co-regulatory model presented here with non-state party formal participation, 
public goal-setting and private international contracts satisfy criteria that scholars have 
proposed as essential to a functioning climate change policy including a measurable 
                                               
64 Karin Buhmann, ―Regulating Corporate Social and Human Rights Responsibilities at the UN Plane: 
Institutionalising New Forms of Law and Law-Making Approaches?‖ (2009) 78 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 1, 15. 
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environmental outcome, equity in application, participation and compliance. 65Where 
States negotiate in good faith for meaningful quantitative environmental targets and 
individual firms commit to making quantitative reductions, then there will be 
measurable environmental outcomes. Likewise, the co-regulatory method offers an 
equitable approach because it focuses on sector-wide reductions and adaptations rather 
than on the artificial division of Annex 1 versus non-Annex 1 membership. More so 
than other approach, co-regulation provides for meaningful participation from more 
stakeholders which should contribute to greater levels of compliance with negotiated 
agreements. 
3.4 Challenges Inherent in Co-Regulation as a Climate Governance 
Strategy 
 
While this proposal should remedy some of the deficiencies in legitimacy of the current 
intergovernmental system and address some of the self-regulation accountability 
concerns, an international proposal for co-regulation has certain inherent challenges 
including biases in favour of certain types of corporation, lowest common denominator 
problem, administrative costs, and quasi-state corporations.  
 
First, certain sized business entities are likely to dominate the membership groups that 
States might invite to formally participate in intergovernmental meetings. Most of 
these entities will be based in Northern countries. Transnational corporations from the 
North have some of the strongest economic interest in setting global emission 
standards and are more likely to be involved in business interest groups such as the ICC 
and WBCSD than small and medium sized domestic based companies. Better-resourced 
groups from the North may set the industry agenda without the input of business actors 
from the South who may or may not be able to comply with the sector standards 
because of financial constraints.  
 
This North-South imbalance is an inevitable problem of attempting to create single 
shared targets for industry-wide sectors. In terms of the success of this proposal, States 
should seek participation by the largest emitters such as transnational companies who 
are more likely to have the capacity to create company-specific implementation plans. 
Large polluting national firms that do not participate in substantial cross border trade 
such as China‘s largest coal producer Shenhua Energy will likely be reluctant to 
participate since they are not concerned with influencing international standards so 
much as they are concerned with influencing domestic policymaking. These industries 
would be regulated under the domestic legislations that States are expected to 
promulgate in response to the adoption of the international performance standards. 
 
For the success of an international covenant, not all companies within a corporate sector 
need to participate in the covenant process for the environmental covenants to still be a 
success in terms of changing firm behaviour. The key will be persuading the largest 
                                               
65 Joseph E. Aldy, Scott Barrett, and Robert Stavins, Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate 
Policy Architectures (2003) 3 Climate Policy 373-397. 
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players in a sector to participate in hopes that their participation will create normative 
or possibly economic pressures on smaller industry players to adapt their corporate 
behaviour.   
 
A second limitation on the sector wide covenant approach is the high likelihood of 
disagreements among corporate actors within a sector.  On key environmental 
implementation issues, there are likely to be differences of opinion. Where individual 
companies have already invested in certain strategies, they will be unlikely to concede to 
the environmental management choices of their competitors. What may result is that 
sectors who cannot reach consensus among its members to define best environmental 
practices will instead defer to a lowest common denominator solution. Sectors will only 
be willing to commit to achieving easy environmental targets. The more difficult 
targets will remain subject to the fragmentation of domestic policymaking.  While there 
is no singular solution to the problem of the lowest common denominator, this paper 
argues that meaningful non-State participation even at less than optimal levels will still 
create conditions of social reciprocity among State and non-State actors. These linkages 
may generate unexpected compromises among industry actors which can more rapidly 
achievement of environmental goals than the current State-centric system.  
 
A third limitation to the covenant approach is the cost of administering the program. In 
the Netherlands, the government was committed to negotiating environmental 
covenants and allocated $70 million to cover negotiations with 600 companies 
representing 85-95% of the primary energy consumption within the State. 66The number 
of global companies involved in ongoing negotiations would be obviously much higher 
if international co-regulation approach is adopted even if only the largest multinationals 
were approached to enter covenants.  Secretariats may be able to better manage costs if 
they focus on negotiating a single covenant targeted at the largest sector contributing 
to a specifically defined collective problem (e.g. agriculture sector for methane 
reduction, chemical sector for HCFCs and oil, gas, and coal sectors for carbon dioxide 
reductions).  
Finally, there will be problems with applying co-regulation approaches to fully owned 
government companies. These companies may or may not be subject to rigorous 
government environmental regulation in their home country or in the countries they 
currently operate.  States are likely to resist imposing performance standards on these 
entities. This is an issue that would need to be addressed explicitly by both States and 
private actors especially for industries such as the oil production industry where many 
of the largest producers are nationalized oil companies. 67 
 
                                               
66 OECD supra note 28, at 110. 
67 See e.g. Petronas is Malaysia‘s national petroleum corporation and one of the largest multinationals in 
the developing world with business interests in 31 countries. It is wholly owned by the government and 
controls the entire oil and gas industry in Malaysia. Most of the oil being produced today is produced by 
nationalized corporations including Saudi Arabian Oil Company, National Iranian Oil Company, Iraq 
National Oil Company, Kuwait National Oil Company, and Petroleos de Venezuela S.A.. 
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Conclusion 
 
Co-regulation of corporations alone will not address all responsible actors. Industries 
are only one part, albeit a large part, of the emission reduction puzzle. States with their 
large operating budgets and individuals (e.g. farmer cutting rainforest in Brazil) are also 
notable carbon contributors.  Yet international co-regulation based on scaling up the 
success in the Dutch covenant model is an underexplored international regulatory 
strategy. States have relied too heavily on seeking national commitments rather than 
creating an ongoing dialogue with non-state transnational actors about what steps 
private large emitters are willing to undertake to reduce their firm and sector emissions.  
Co-regulation provides an opportunity to get beyond the current State to State impasse 
by instead offering a more transparent and legitimate regulatory space for both public 
and private stakeholders to seek mutually possible environmental management 
solutions.  
 
Co-regulation is proposed as a method. Whether it will deliver adequate mitigation on 
an international level or even on a national level remains to be seen. But at least, it 
should be considered as a legal option to shift the existing status quo where some 
companies innovate and many wait for direction on how to innovate.   Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in a speech at Ogelthorpe University in 1932 urged students to ―not confuse 
objectives with methods…The country needs and …. demands bold, persistent 
experimentation. It is common sense to take a method and try it: If it fails, admit it 
frankly and try another.‖68  
 
The UNFCCC has declared a global objective that includes mitigating emissions. As 
this paper argues, co-regulation may be a method that leads both public and private 
actors a more pragmatic cooperation. Even if co-regulation is only a partial solution to 
mitigation of emissions, it will be something. Roosevelt‘s sentiments in his 1932 speech 
continue to remain true in this time of super-wicked problems, ―But above all, try 
something.‖ 69 
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Experimentation", (Speech to Ogelthorpe University, May 22, 1932)  
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